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"The question tonight, as I understand it, is ... what next? In
my little humble way of understanding it, it points toward either
the ballot or the bullet."
Malcolm X1
I. INTRODUCTION

In the mass of legal documents filed on behalf of the respondent

in the recent Second Amendment case District of Columbia v.
Heller, one stands out.2 The Congress of Racial Equality, or CORE,
Copyright 2009, by ANDERS WALKER.
Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Ph.D., Yale
University; J.D., Duke University; B.A., Wesleyan University. I would like to
thank Bronwen Morgan and my fellow contributors to The Intersection of Rights
and Regulation: New Directions in Socio-Legal Scholarship (Bronwen Morgan
ed., 2007), especially Jeffrey R. Dudas, for help in formulating some of the ideas
used to frame this piece. I would also like to thank Patricia Tuitt and the
participants in Rights and Regulation: Private Violence and the Authority of Law,
a workshop held at the 2005 Oxford Summer Institute, sponsored by the Law &
Society Association and the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies.
1. Malcolm X, Address, The Ballot or the Bullet, Cleveland, Ohio (Apr. 3,
1964), reprintedin MALCOLM X SPEAKS 23 (George Breitman ed., 1965).
2. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
*
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the same organization that orchestrated the freedom rides in 1961
and hosted Malcolm X's "Ballot or the Bullet" speech in Cleveland
in 1964, submitted a brief supporting the individual right to bear
arms. 3 Forty pages in length, the document provided wellsubstantiated examples of how law had long been used to keep
guns from African-Americans, particularly during slavery,
Reconstruction, and the early part of the twentieth century.4 Then,
in a remarkable move, the brief maintained that even current gun
control efforts in the twenty-first century are motivated by a basic
fear that minorities, particularly
African-Americans, "are not to be
5
trusted with firearms."
CORE's claim that gun control is racist raises a variety of
questions about the constitutional implications of Heller. First,
how, if at all, is the regulation of arms racially discriminatory?
Second, what rights, if any, do arms regulations infringe? Third, if
arms regulations are discriminatory, does this make Heller a
victory for civil rights?
Borrowing from Derrick Bell's interest convergence thesis, this
Article posits that Heller is a victory for civil rights, but not in the
sense that most activists from the 1960s would recognize. 6 Rather
than a product of mid-century legal liberalism, Heller marks the
culmination of almost forty years of coalition-based popular
constitutionalism aimed at transforming the individual right to bear
arms and the common law right to "employ deadly force in selfdefense" into new civil rights. Frustrated by legal liberalism's
3. Brief for Congress of Racial Equality as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290)
[hereinafter CORE Brief]. For CORE's role in the freedom rides, see RAYMOND
ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
50-60 (2006). For a general history of CORE, including an account of its turn to
the right in the 1960s, see AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWiCK, CORE: A
STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1942-1968 (1973).
4. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 4-24.
5. Id.at 24.
6. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
7. The "right of individuals to employ deadly force in self-defense" is a
quote directly from the NRA's Heller brief. See Brief for the National Rifle
Association and the NRA Civil Rights Defense Fund as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 30, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter NRA Brief]. I borrow the term "popular
constitutionalism" from Larry Kramer. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

(2004). While Kramer provides several good examples of non-judicial
constitutional interpretation and mobilization in the nineteenth century, I could
just as easily rely on the work of Reva Siegel, Robert Post, and William
Eskridge to illustrate the role that left-centered social movements have played in
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failure to control violent crime, a bi-racial coalition of black and
white conservatives adopted the very same rights talk deployed by
the NAACP and Martin Luther King, Jr. in the 1950s and 1960s to
advance a pro-gun, pro-self-defense agenda in the 1970s and
1980s. Perhaps the biggest proponent of this agenda, the National
Rifle Association (NRA) reframed the right to bear arms and the
right to self-defense as civil rights that were firmly established at
the time of8 the founding and therefore deserving of constitutional
protection.
While much of the campaign to consecrate guns drew from
what Jeffrey R. Dudas and others have identified as the "politics of
resentment," a notion that certain minorities, particularly criminal
defendants have received special rights, not all of it was animated
by anti-minoritarian sentiment. 9 At least some of the push for guns

constitutional change in the twentieth century. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on ConstitutionalLaw in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power. Policentric
Interpretationof the Family and MedicalLeave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003);
Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001). See also MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court rarely
enters an area without some degree of political support for its positions, support
often mobilized by non-judicial actors).
8. The NRA identifies private gun ownership and the right to use deadly
force in self-defense as nothing less than "human," "civil," and "constitutional
rights." See NRA Brief, supra note 7, at 2. As for self-defense, the NRA notes
that the "essential right to self-defense, including defense of the home, has
always been engrained in American jurisprudence." Id. at 31.
9. Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the Name of Equal Rights: "Special" Rights and
the Politics of Resentment in Post-CivilRights America, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
723, 731 (2005). For earlier exponents of the politics of resentment, see
generally DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1995); WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE:
DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX (1991); THOMAS B.
EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS,

AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH

THING As FREE SPEECH (AND IT'S A GOOD THING TOO) (1994); GARRY WILLS,

NIXON AGONISTES: THE CRISIS OF THE SELF-MADE MAN (1970). Just as the

NAACP argued that state regulations on interracial contact harmed innocent
citizens, for example, so too did groups like CORE, the National Rifle
Association, and the Institute for Justice maintain that state regulation of guns
caused substantial harm as well. By turning to the hortatory language of rights,
conservatives maintained that recognizing a right to bear arms and a right to
self-defense were not in conflict with the civil rights movement, but were
actually necessary to fulfill its promise.
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came from a genuine belief that firearms bolstered civil rights by
deterring violent crime without inviting the rights-averse tyranny of
a police state.10 Convinced that they were carrying on the mantel of
the civil rights movement by safeguarding liberty, both CORE and
the NRA pushed private ownership of firearms as essential to any
meaningful "human, civil, or constitutional" rights regime."l
Interestingly, the NRA even challenged the NAACP's
reputation as the nation's preeminent civil rights group, declaring
itself to be the "oldest civil rights organization" in America in its
Heller brief. 12 While this claim would have certainly rankled
veterans of the civil rights movement like former Justice and
NAACP lawyer Thurgood Marshall, it did not rile the present
Court. 13 In fact, the Court rejects arguments made by the NAACP
in Heller, siding instead with the NRA and CORE. 14
What does the anointing of CORE and the NRA as arbiters of
civil rights mean? As this Article will show, Heller marks the
beginning of a new chapter of civil rights constitutionalism
animated by a new convergence of white and black interests
around the kinds of civil rights that deserve constitutional
protection. According to Derrick Bell, interest convergence occurs
10. The NRA emphasizes firearms as deterrents in its brief NRA Brief, supra
note 7, at 32. Scalia emphasizes private gun ownership as a defense against the
"tyrant." District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008).
11. NRA Brief, supra note 7, at 2.
12. Id. at 1.
13. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).
14. The NAACP's argument rests on four basic premises, namely that the
Second Amendment does not protect an individual right to keep and bear arms
and that finding an individual right to bear arms would disrupt firearms
regulations nationwide, prevent states from dealing with gun violence, and fail
to address problems of racial justice in criminal law. See Brief for NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6, 18, 25, 29-30. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter NAACP Brief]. While the Supreme Court does
not mention the NAACP's brief expressly, it rejects its claims that the Second
Amendment protects a collective right and that upholding an individual right to
bear arms either disrupts state law or prevents states from dealing with gun
violence. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-2805, 2816-22. That the vision of civil
rights dominant in the 1960s has declined in national popularity is not a novel
claim. Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, two of many prominent
scholars of twentieth century race relations, both show that the post-civil rights
era was one of resentment and retrenchment on the part of the majority against
minority gains. That being said, neither Klinkner nor Smith seem to realize that
"resentment" aside, average middle class white voters might have actually
believed that their rights, and Americans' rights generally, were reinforced by
guns. See generally PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY
MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999).
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when even the slightest black interest converges with white
interests to produce a civil rights victory. 15 Without such a
convergence, argues Bell, there tend not to be civil rights gains,
meaning that the NAACP's victory in Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954 happened not simply because the Court wanted
to correct racial injustice, but because there were other interests at
stake as well. 16 Perhaps foremost among these was a governmental
imperative to improve America's Cold War image.' 7
The Cold War, of course, is over. However, Heller suggests
that a new convergence of interests has occurred, one that unites
gun rights enthusiasts, small government conservatives, and a
distinct minority of black voters who maintain that the
deregulation of arms promotes security and bolsters liberty.' 8 This
claim, made by several briefs in Heller, manifests itself in the
articulation of two new civil rights. The first, the individual right to
bear arms, empowers the Supreme Court to overturn unreasonable
federal regulations of private arms as a violation of the Second
Amendment. The second, the right to "employ deadly force in selfdefense," gives the Court the power to overrule regulations that
impinge on citizens' efforts to guard themselves
19 and their homes,
concerns.
Amendment
Second
of
independent
This last right, generally treated as a creature of criminal law,
is one of the more subtle contributions of District of Columbia v.
Heller. Following CORE's suggestion that the right to selfdefense is a "fundamental right" and the NRA's suggestion that it
is an "essential right," the Supreme Court held that self-defense is
in fact an "inherent right" capable of protecting those arms
15. Bell, supra note 6, at 523.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 524.
18. In explaining the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, Bell maintained
the "interest of blacks" was only "accommodated" by the Supreme Court when
it "converges" with the interests of whites. Id. at 523.
19. NRA Brief, supra note 7, at 30. I refer to the individual right to bear
arms as a new civil right for two reasons. One, Heller is the first time that the
Supreme Court has endorsed such a right. Two, even though proponents of the
individual right have claimed that it predates the founding, it is only since the
1970s that it has been framed as a "civil" right. See, e.g., CONSTANCE EMERSON
CROOKER, GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS 41-76 (2003).
20. Most constitutional law treatises do not include the right to self-defense
as a fundamental right worthy of constitutional protection. See, e.g., ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1997);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000). Instead,
the right is generally covered in criminal law texts as a subset of the justification
defense. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S.
STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 738-83 (8th ed. 2007); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 539-50 (4th ed. 2003).
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"overwhelmingly chosen by American society" to defend self,
family, and property. 2 ' One of those arms, what Scalia terms the
"quintessential self-defense weapon," is the handgun.22
The implications of the Court recognizing self-defense as a
fundamental right are potentially great. For one, Heller's
affirmation of self-defense provides a constitutional basis for
protecting arms that does not necessarily rely on incorporating the
Second Amendment to the states. 23 By identifying an "inherent"
right to self-defense, the Court suggests that draconian state bans
on the "quintessential self-defense weapon," the handgun, will
never pass constitutional review regardless of Second Amendment
concerns. 24 As several briefs filed in Heller suggest, such bans
either deprive "persons" of their "liberty" to defend their lives and
homes, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause; 25 or, conversely, they strip "citizens" of one of their most
important "privileges and immunities," the privilege to own a gun
for self-defense and the immunity from prosecution in cases of
justified use of deadly force.26
Looked at from a socio-legal perspective, Heller's invocation
of self-defense not only sounds a warning for state gun bans, but
reverses the federal government's policy of what Jonathan Simon
has called "governing through crime." Since the 1960s, argues
Simon, the federal government has used crime as an excuse to
expand state power.78 Heller suggests the opposite is going on.
Rather than expanding state power, the Supreme Court is
relinquishing it by avoiding further expansions of the criminal
justice system in favor of using private violence as a legitimate
21. NRA Brief, supra note 7, at 31. According to CORE, "[t]he right of
defending one's life is one of the most basic rules of nature," and the "right to
defend oneself from deadly attack" is a "fundamental right." CORE Brief, supra
note 3, at 39. According to the NRA, the right to self-defense is an "essential"
right. NRA Brief, supra note 7, at 31. Scalia identifies the right to self-defense as
an "inherent" right. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008).
22. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
23. While the Court can overturn earlier rulings, it held expressly that the
Second Amendment did not apply to the states in United States v. Cruikshank.
92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
24. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
25. NRA Brief, supra note 7, at 17.
26. As this article will illustrate, the Court's most direct path to overturning
state gun bans would be simply to hold those bans in violation of the same
liberty interest that bans on abortion violate. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113(1973).

27. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR 5 (2007).

28. Id. at 3-4.
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means of crime control. This turn to private violence, or what
Lawrence Friedman has called a "private system of criminal
justice," echoes America's longstanding vigilante tradition,
suggesting that even conservatives have begun tog
2 rOw weary of
America's costly, statist prison-industrial complex.
To explain more clearly how Heller represents a return to
private criminal justice and an endorsement of a new civil rights,
this Article will proceed in five parts. Part II will recover the
argument that CORE makes in its brief, showing how it uses the
history of slavery and Reconstruction, not the founding, to frame
armed self-defense as a civil right inextricably linked to
citizenship. Part III will discuss the interests that appear to be
converging in Heller by comparing CORE's brief to other briefs
filed in the case, including a brief filed by a majority of Senators
and Representatives in Congress, as well as a brief filed by the
NRA. Part IV will walk through Scalia's majority opinion in
Heller showing how it begins with the founding but then moves
quickly to an affirmation of the arguments made by CORE and the
NRA.5 Part V will provide a historical explanation for why these
interests have converged in the manner that they have and what
this means for civil rights generally.
II. FROM FREEDOM RIDES TO .45's: THE CORE BRIEF

Before discussing CORE's brief, it is helpful to provide some
of the history of the organization. Founded in 1942 by college
students in Chicago, the Congress of Racial Equality was not
initially dedicated to armed self-defense. 3 1 Inspired by the peaceful
teachings of Mahatma Ghandi, CORE spent over two decades
advocating non-violent protest as a means of dismantling racial

29.

For Friedman's discussion of the "private system of criminal justice,"
M. FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 440-41 (3d ed.
2005). While popular support for the prison-industrial complex seemed
boundless in the 1990s, states have recently begun to question the fiscal
desirability of further increases in mass incarceration. See, e.g., THE PEW
CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS Prison08 FINA
L 2-1-1 FORWEB.pdf. In Texas alone, annual expenditures on corrections
exceeded three billion dollars last year, a crushing number that has pushed the
state to develop a variety of "problem-solving courts" aimed at diverting
offenders from prison. Transcript, Texas Court Aims to "DIVERT" First-Time
Offenders (National Public Radio broadcast Aug. 15, 2008) (on file with the

see

LAWRENCE

author).
30.

128 S.Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

31.

MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 3, at 4.
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segregation in the American South. 32 In 1947, CORE targeted
segregation on interstate carriers by staging an integrated bus ride
through Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky,
something it called the "Journey of Reconciliation."33 In 1961,
under the leadership of James Farmer, CORE orchestrated a
similar protest by driving integrated buses filled with "freedom
riders" through Deep South states like Alabama where white
34 mobs
set fire to one bus and brutalized the occupants of another.
In 1964, CORE continued its commitment to nonviolence by
sending volunteers to Mississippi to participate in a voter
35
education and registration project known as Freedom Summer.
White resistance to Freedom Summer quickly became violent in
June culminating in the murder of three CORE volunteers: Andrew
Goodman, James Chaney, and Michael Schwerner. 36 Despite
Lyndon Johnson's promise to send the FBI into Mississippi to
protect the remaining activists left in the state, continued
harassment by locals led CORE to doubt the federal government's
commitment to the black struggle. 37 Those doubts turned to disgust
when the Democratic Party, aided by Lyndon Johnson, worked to
derail a challenge to Mississippi's 1964 presidential delegation by
a group of CORE activists and Freedom Summer veterans who
called themselves the "Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party" or
MFDP.38
The MFDP's failure to unseat Mississippi's lily-white
delegation, together with the deaths of Schwerner, Chaney, and
Goodman, led members of CORE to experience "mounting
disillusionment" with the Democratic Party and the liberal
39 Though the organization maintained a
coalition that supported it.
public commitment to nonviolence, activists on the ground began
to doubt whether the federal government would ever truly protect
civil rights workers. As racist violence continued in the South,
more and more proponents of nonviolence began to advocate
armed self-defense. To take just a few examples, NAACP official
Robert F. Williams implored black activists to meet "violence with
violence" in North Carolina after a white jury acquitted a white

32. Id. at6-11.
33. Id.at 33-39.
34.

Id. at 135-58.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.at 275-81.
Id.at 277.
Id.
Id.at 279, 281.
Id.at 281.
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defendant of raping and beating a black woman in 1959.40 In 1964,
Charles Evers, brother of assassinated NAACP officer Medgar
Evers, declared that blacks "will shoot back" if attacked in
Tennessee. 4 1 Following the attempted assassination of James
Meredith in Mississippi in June 1966, CORE leader Floyd
McKissick joined Stokely Carmichael, a coordinator for the
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, or SNCC, in
calling for armed self-defense and "Black Power.' 4 2 By the time of
CORE's 1966 convention in Baltimore, McKissick
had begun to
43
publicly declare nonviolence a dying philosophy.
Moves toward armed self-defense in the South coincided with
militant calls for black arms in the North as well. Perhaps no
African-American leader personified this better than black Muslim
minister Malcolm X. 44 In 1964, X extolled the use of "the bullet"
as a viable alternative to the formal political
process
or "the ballot"
•
45
during a CORE sponsored talk in Cleveland. While X's call to
arms hinted at the idea of armed revolt, he also stressed the need
for armed self-defense. "It is criminal to teach a man not to defend
himself when he is the constant victim of brutal attacks,"
announced X in New York City in March 1964, "[w]hen our
people are being
bitten by dogs, they are within their rights to kill
46
those dogs."
Though CORE president James Farmer remained wary of X in
the early 1960s, CORE leader Floyd McKissick took inspiration
from his message when he rose to the helm in 1966. 47 CORE's
rejection of nonviolence and turn towards Malcolm X's call for
armed self-defense were widely misinterpreted in the press,
leading many to think that McKissick and others aimed for violent

40. TIMOTHY B. TYSON, RADIO FREE DIXIE: ROBERT F. WILLIAMS AND THE
ROOTS OF BLACK POWER 149 (1999).

41. Evers told Robert Penn Warren that blacks would "shoot back" during
an interview in 1964. See ROBERT PENN WARREN, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE
NEGRO? 109 (1965).
42. MEIER & RUDWIcK, supra note 3, at 412.
43. Id. at 414.
44. For Malcolm X's history with the Nation of Islam, see generally
MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1965).
45. MALCOLM X, supra note 1, at 23. X delivered a chilling endorsement of
armed action to Robert Penn Warren in 1964, when he declared that if he came
home and found his child bitten by a "snake" that he would go "out" and "kill
snakes," whether they had "blood on their jaws" or not. WARREN, supra note 41,
at 261.
46. M.S. Handler, Malcolm X Sees Rise in Violence: Says Negroes Are
Ready to Act in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1964, at 20.
47. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 3, at 417.
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revolution.48 This was not the case. CORE's endorsement of guns
coincided closely with a larger shift on its part away from
integrationist thinking and towards Stokely Carmichael's plea for
black power. 49 Black power, for CORE, manifested itself primarily
in the form of community-based programs aimed at developing
black businesses, promoting economic independence, and
providing job training to inner-city youth. 50 Guns, insofar as they
were part of this program, aimed to provide African-Americans
with a means of self-defense, not political revolt. 51 This became all
the more important once CORE began to 52lobby for local
community control of schools, courts, and police.
While other proponents of black power, most notably the Black
Panthers, became entangled in a series of violent conflicts with
police, not all proponents of black self-defense adopted an
antagonistic posture towards the state.53 Under the leadership of
Floyd McKissick, for example, CORE translated black power's
emphasis on self-reliance, economic independence, and armed
self-defense into a platform appealing to the political right.54 In
1968, McKissick publicly endorsed Richard Nixon for President,
an open revolt against the civil rights movement's identification
with the Democratic Party. 55 Impressed with McKissick's
emphasis on self-reliance and small government, Nixon in turn
helped the black leader found Soul City, an all-black township in
North Carolina.56 Nixon also endorsed black power inspired
programs designed to instill personal responsibility and economic
independence, including the 57
Office of Minority Business
Enterprise and affirmative action.
When McKissick left CORE to dedicate himself to Soul City in
1968, an even more conservative proponent of black power named
Roy Innis replaced him. 58 Innis denounced the left-wing leanings
of radical civil rights groups like SNCC, renounced revolutionary
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id. at415-16.
Id.at415.
Id.at416.

WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, NEW DAY IN BABYLON: THE BLACK POWER
MOvEMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1965 TO 1975 45-60 (1992).
54. MEIER & RUDWiCK, supra note 3, at 417.

55. James T. Wooten, Integrated City Rising on an Old Plantation,N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1972, at 21; Wayne King, McKissick is Succeeding Although
Not "Supposed To; " A Spur to County, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 29.
56. King, supranote 55, at 29.
57. DEAN J. KOTLOWsKI, NIXON'S CiviL. RIGHTS: POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND
POLICY 97-98, 125 (2001).
58. MEIER & RUDwiCK, supra note 3, at 423.
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change in favor of gradual reform and placed "black capitalism" at
the center of CORE's mission. As political liberals abandoned
the group, Innis led CORE into the twenty-first century and
towards a pro-Republican, pro-gun platform closely aligned with
the National Rifle Association, of which Innis became a member. 60
Understanding CORE's trajectory from a liberal civil rights
organization to a conservative group mistrustful of state power
helps explain its decision to oppose D.C.'s gun ban in Heller.
Indeed, it is CORE's sense of history, both its own and the history
of black America's struggle with southern state regulations
generally, that help explain the heavy emphasis on the past in its
brief. "The history of gun control in America," begins CORE, for
example, is one of "discrimination, disenfranchisement, and
oppression of racial and
ethnic minorities, immigrants, and other
'undesirable' groups." 61 Such discrimination, CORE continues,
began during the colonial era and persisted through the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. To illustrate, CORE divides the first half
of its brief into three sections: one on slavery, the
62 second on
Reconstruction, and the third on Post-Reconstruction.
In its section on slavery, CORE draws from sources prior to the
founding to establish that southern colonies used gun regulations
not simply to control crime but also to exclude blacks from civic
life.6 3 Indeed, the underlying theme of CORE's first section is that
guns consistently served as an indicator of citizenship in the United
States, much like the right to vote. As early as 1748, for example,
free blacks in Virginia were denied the right to own a gun, despite
64
the fact that they were neither slaves nor indentured servants.
Citing historian Winthrop Jordan, CORE makes it clear that the
right to bear arms was "an important right and obligation" that
marked "membership in the white community., 65 Interestingly,
this was long before Virginia became a part of the United States,
59. Id.
60. James O'Connor, Roy Innis Defines Himself and Politics,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1996, at WC1.
61. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 2.
62. Id at ii, 3.
63. Examples of pre-convention sources that CORE cites include: An Act
for the Better Ordering & Governing of Negroes and Slaves, in 7 STATUTES AT
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 353-54 (D.J. McCord ed., 1836-1837); An Act for
Preventing Negroes Insurrections, in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619 481 (W.W. Hening ed., 1823). See CORE

Brief, supra note 3, at 5.
64. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 7 (citing VA. CODE ch. 3, §§ 7, 8 (1819)).
65. Id.at 4 (citing WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550 TO 1812 78 (1968)).
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suggesting that the right to bear arms pre-dated the founding and
was inextricably linked to personal citizenship, not militia duty, a
non-existent concern while the colonies were under British military
protection.
To reinforce its argument that the denial of arms was part of a
larger attempt to curtail personal citizenship, CORE discusses the
extensive regulation of black arms across the South during the
colonial period. Hence, in 1748 Virginia enacted a statute
declaring that "[n]o free negro or mulatto, shall be suffered to keep
or carry any firelock of any kind, any military weapon, or any
powder or lead.",66 South Carolina imposed blanket restrictions on
black gun ownership "for the better ordering and governing of
Negroes," not just slaves, in 1712. 67 Three years later, Maryland
enacted a similar law declaring that "[n]o negro" in the colony
"shall be permitted to carry any gun, or any other offensive
weapon."9)6 Soon all the southern colonies had extensive
regulations
69 preventing free blacks from keeping or bearing
firearms.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 did little to change
things. In 1801, the newly minted capitol of Washington,
combined the laws of Virginia and Maryland to prevent any
"negro" from carrying "any gun, or any other offensive weapon.""
To eighteenth century abolitionist St. George Tucker, such severe
weapons restrictions became tantamount to applying "badges of
slavery" to the entire black population. 7 1 Indeed, gun ownership
became so closely intertwined with the notion of basic citizenship
that denying blacks arms was akin to imposing upon them a
condition that Orlando Patterson has called "social death.97 2 This
social, or civic, death continued through the antebellum era, even
becoming national policy in 1856 when Chief Justice Roger Taney
ruled that the Constitution could not possibly have been intended
to allow free blacks to "keep and carry arms wherever they
went., 73 According to Taney, the right to bear arms was

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 7 (citing VA. CODE ch. 3, §§ 7, 8 (1819)).
Id.at 4.
Id.at 7.
Id.at 6.
Id.at 6-7.
Id.at 7.
See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1982).
73. CORE cites Dred Scott v. Sanford in its brief. See CORE Brief, supra
note 3, at 8-9 (citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17
(1856)).
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inextricably linked to citizenship, something that he refused to
extend to African-Americans. 74
CORE's resuscitation of black history provides a compelling
counterpoint to some of the historical arguments advanced by the
petitioners and their supporters in Heller.7 5 According to Pulitzer
Prize-winning historian Jack Rakove, for example, gun ownership
was so common during the early Republic that possessing arms
was no different from possessing other property like a cow, a chair,
or a wagon. 76 Indeed, in an amicus brief endorsing D.C.'s gun ban,
Rakove joins Washington University professor David Konig to
maintain that guns were "subject to the regulation to which all
property was liable"
77 and were "not major issues in eighteenthcentury America.,

While CORE agrees that guns were subject to a variety of
regulations, it takes issue with Rakove's assertion that guns were
"not major issues" in the eighteenth century.7 8 For blacks, guns and
their regulation were critical issues. Legal moves to deny blacks
arms were not only critical to their repression, but actually marked
a type of disfranchisement qua disarmament that was used to keep
them firmly barred from the political sphere. Not only were gun
regulations a serious issue, but the right to bear arms was "an
important right and obligation" that marked "membership 79
in the
white community" and, by extension, citizenship in the state.
By identifying gun ownership as an "important right," CORE
bolsters the notion that the right to bear arms was not simply a
creature of the state militia. 80 In fact, CORE's invocation of black
history reveals that guns and citizenship were inextricably linked,
much like citizenship and voting. Looked at theoretically, CORE's
story of gun restrictions and race during the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries reinforces its stance that the
right to bear arms should be considered an individual civil right.8 '
74. Id.
75. Brief for Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07-290); Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 13, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07290) [hereinafter Rakove Brief].
76. Rakove Brief, supra note 75, at 13.
77. Id.at 12-13.
78. Id.at 12.
79. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
80. Id.(citing WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATTITUDEs TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550 TO 1812 78 (1968)).
81. See CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 4-19. CORE's extensive discussion of
the relationship between guns and citizenship sets the stage for the possibility
that the Slaughter-House Cases might be revisited and privileges and
immunities extended to include either the right to bear arms, or at the very least
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While CORE could easily have stopped with the assertion that
the right to bear arms mentioned in the Second Amendment is in
fact an individual right, it goes on. Borrowing from lessons that it
learned in the Deep South in the 1960s, CORE also roots the right
82
to bear arms in the ancient common law right of self-defense.
Asserting that the "right of defending one's life is one of the most
basic rules of nature," CORE identifies the right to bear arms in
self-defense as nothing less than a fundamental right.83
By invoking the language of fundamental rights, CORE
introduces the possibility that the right to bear arms in self-defense
might be protected by the Ninth Amendment, not the Second.
According to the Ninth Amendment, the "enumeration" of certain
rights in the Constitution "shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." 84 That the people have
long retained a right to self-defense is something that CORE
advances in its brief, opening the door for the argument that
without guns, the right to self-defense "from a deadly attack"
would be abridged.85
Though not immediately applicable to the District, CORE's
mention of self-defense as a fundamental right raises the
possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment might be used to strike
down state gun bans. 86 The Supreme Court has long held that the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
enumerated in the
Amendment protect fundamental rights not
88
87
Constitution, including the right to privacy, the right to travel,
and "rights growing out of the marital relationship."89 By
identifying the right to self-defense as one such right, CORE
suggests that the Supreme Court might use self-defense to strike

the right to use arms in self-defense. The Institute for Justice makes just such a
case in its brief. See infra Part III.
82. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 38-39. Widely accepted in the criminal
law, the principle of justification, or self-defense, holds that an individual is
authorized to use deadly force in cases where that individual reasonably believes
that the use of deadly force is imminent against him. JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 221-49 (3d ed. 2001).
83. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 39.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, reprinted in KERMIT L. HALL ET AL.,
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 686 (3d ed. 2005).
85. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 39.
86. HALL, supra note 84, at 690.
87. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
89. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 326 (1993)
(citing Zablocki v. Red Hail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
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down state gun bans without ever invoking the Second
Amendment.9 °
To bolster its claim that guns are necessary for self-defense,
CORE returns to black history. After the Civil War, argues CORE,
southern states immediately continued the process of
disfranchisement qua disarmament by enacting Black Codes aimed
at controlling newly-freed slaves. 91 These codes denied AfricanAmericans a variety of basic civil rights including the right to
travel freely, assemble in public spaces, vote, and bear arms. 92 In
Mississippi, for example, no "freedman, free negro, or mulatto"
could "keep or carry firearms of any kind, or any ammunition"
as
93
early as 1866, only one year after fighting had ceased.
Concerned that blacks were being stripped of their newfound
liberties, the federal government intervened, enacting a
Freedman's Bureau Act in 1866 and a Civil Rights Act that same
year to prevent southern states from re-subjugating their black
populations. 94 A critical component of the Freedman's Bureau Act,
notes CORE, was a provision holding that "personal liberty,"
"personal security," and the "constitutional right to bear arms" had
to be secured among African-Americans. 95 Along similar lines, a
central goal of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was to take away
southern states' police power to deny weapons to blacks. 96 For the
radical Republicans who endorsed both statutes, the federal
government was one of the few bodies powerful enough to
intervene in the South on behalf of freed people of color, and even
then blacks needed guns.97 CORE asserted that "[i]n Mississippi
men who were in the rebel armies are traversing the state, visiting
the freedmen, disarming them, perpetrating murders and outrages
upon them," quoting a statement from a Reconstruction-era
Massachusetts Republican. 98 Vigilante attacks on African

90. This evades the problem of having to overrule Cruikshank. While
Cruikshank held that the Second Amendment has not been incorporated to the
states, CORE is suggesting that the Second Amendment need not be
incorporated to the states in order for states to strike down gun bans. United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
91. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 9.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 10 (citing 1866 Miss. Laws ch. 23, § 1, 165 (1865)).
94. Id. at 10-11.
95. Id. at 11 (citing 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866)).
96. Id. at 11.
97. Id. at 10 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 264-66

(1998)).

98. Id.at 11 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1865)).
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Americans spiked after the Civil War, convincing 99federal officials
that more intrusive legal measures were necessary.
In July 1868, radical Republicans succeeded in getting a
majority of states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution declaring anyone born in the United States a citizen
whose rights to equal protection and due process were enforceable
by the federal government against the states.10° During the debate
over the amendment, Kansas Senator Samuel Pomeroy declared
that there were three rights that safeguarded all the others: the riuht
to vote, the right to own property, and the right to bear arms. 01
Senator Jacob M. Howard agreed, declaring one of the personal
rights protected
by the Amendment to be the "right to keep and
1 02
bear arms."'
Republican hopes that the Fourteenth Amendment might be
used to protect black arms became a significant force behind the
drafting and ratification of the bill in the North. 10 3 Of course, that
amendment does not apply to the federal capitol of Washington.
However, its history bolsters CORE's larger argument that arms
were necessary for blacks to defend themselves. It also helps
precisely explain how they were linked. Following the Civil War,
northern Republicans hoped that guns might serve as a type of
private device for helping slaves who could not trust their state or
local novernments to defend them against racist vigilante
attacks.
Of course, southern states subverted northern intentions by
developing a variety of creative legal means for disarming
blacks. 10 5 Some states banned particular classes of firearms,
focusin on cheap handguns that "poverty-stricken freedmen could
afford."
Other states placed "exorbitant business or transaction
taxes" on the sale of firearms in order to keep guns out of the reach

99. See

CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE,

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
100. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
101. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 12 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st

Sess. 1182 (1866)).
102. Id.at 12-13.
103. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 258-59 (1988); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS,

1866 TO 1876 57-76 (1998).
104. HALBROOK, supra note 103, at 65.
105. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 16.
106. Id.
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of poor blacks. 10 7 Some states, in violation
of the Fourteenth
08
Amendment, simply confiscated weapons. 1
Often state action disarming blacks coincided with vigilante
attacks on them. In Union County, South Carolina, for example,
the local sheriff went into a black community and confiscated arms
only davs before "five hundred masked men" went on a killing
spree. 1°Masked men became a recurring fear in the South as exconfederates banded together to form a terrorist organization called
the Ku Klux Klan. The rise of the Klan, argues CORE, led to a
reconfiguration of the fear surrounding the right to bear arms. i l °
Rather than protect the individual against an encroaching central
government, the right to bear arms became even more important
for self-defense against private violence." 'I
Perhaps the most stunning case of vigilante violence occurred
in Colfax, Louisiana, in 1873. In April of that year, a group of
African-Americans seized control of the county courthouse and
insisted that they be given the chance to vote.r 2 Enraged white
citizens surrounded the courthouse, set it ablaze, and then
murdered the African Americans as they tried to escape." 3 When
surviving black plaintiffs brought suit against Klan members for
violating their right to bear arms, the Supreme Court rejected their
claim, arguing that the Second Amendment did not apply because
it only limited federal action. 114 The Court also held that the
Second Amendment did not apply because the Klansman were not
state actors. 1 15 The ruling handed down in United States v.
Cruikshank in 1875 ignored ties between the Klan and local
elected officials, speeding, 6 black disfranchisement
qua
disarmament across the South.7
CORE's invocation of Cruikshank together with its review of
black history drove home the point that African-Americans had
been consistently denied weapons to facilitate their oppression,
curtail their citizenship, and take their lives. This last point was the
most constitutionally salient. Without guns, CORE argued
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 16 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL

OF RIGHTS 266 (1998)).
112. LANE, supra note 99, at 34.

113. Id.
114. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 19 (citing United States v. Cruickshank,
92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)).
115. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 19.
116. Id.
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convincingly, blacks not only lost a symbolic indicator of
citizenship, but the right to defend themselves against private
vigilante violence."1 7 This was particularly devastating in areas like
the Deep South, where states were not particularly committed to
providing blacks with the kind of protection they needed from
private violence.
To drive this final theme of guns and self-defense home,
CORE concluded its brief by linking the plight of blacks in the
nineteenth century to the plieht of minorities in urban areas at the
dawn of the twenty-first. 11 Noting that African-Americans are
"disproportionately the victims of crime," CORE reminds the
Court that blacks "have no right to demand or even expect police
protection" in their homes or on the street. 1 9 This leaves lawabiding citizens in under-policed urban neighborhoods with few
choices when it comes to defending themselves. Either they can
move, an unrealistic option if they are poor, or they can legally
acquire a firearm. In CORE's view, the right to own a gun
represents both a legal right as well as a form of legal recourse, a
modality through which minorities can assert their citizenship and
seek redress for deprivations of their liberty and property.
CORE's recovery of the right to bear arms as a guardian of
other rights represents, in certain ways, an attempt to point the
Supreme Court away from a narrow examination of the founders'
debates and towards a broader look at what the right to bear arms
actually signified during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Both slavery and Reconstruction, argues CORE, tell us something
important about the relationship between constitutional rights and
gun ownership that the founding does not. 12° While the founders
were concerned with limiting federal power, Reconstruction
presents the opposite dilemma: states dedicated to stripping freed
slaves of their rights, particularly their guns. Removing guns in this
context was not simply a symbolic denial of citizenship, but a
stripping away of the most effective private modality that freed
slaves had for defending their lives: their firearms.
Republicans in Congress knew this. Not only did they hope
that the Civil Rights Acts would help keep arms in black hands,
but black armament was one of the animating forces behind the
Fourteenth Amendment. 12 1 Sadly, the Supreme Court did not
117. Id.
118. Id. at 35-40.
119. Id.at 27, 28.
120. CORE spends no time in its brief discussing either the Convention or
Ratification debates, but rather focuses on slave codes and post-bellum
regulations of African Americans. See CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 4-17.
121. HALBROOKsupra note 103, at 25-60.
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agree. Not only did it curtail the reach of the Second Amendment
in United States v. Cruikshank, but it did so again in another case
involving slaughterhouses in New Orleans. 122 Though CORE did
not even mention the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court used it to
strip the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities
Clause of much of its power by holding that national citizenship
did not include the right to bear arms. 123 This marked a stark
reversal of Justice Roger Taney's assertion in Dred Scott v.
Sanford almost two decades earlier that one of the basic
was not willing to extend
components of citizenship, which Taney
124
to blacks, was the right to bear arms.
Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the
District of Columbia. However, CORE recovers the intentions
behind it to highlight a larger normative claim, namely that without
arms, southern blacks lacked any viable means of defending
themselves. This right to armed self-defense, argues CORE is a
"fundamental right" that deserves constitutional protection. 125 To
reinforce this notion, CORE ends its brief with a nod to the
increase in crime in Washington D.C. since the gun ban was
enacted in 1976-a move designed to illustrate the state's failure to
provide its citizens with basic security. 126
III. THE CONVERGENCE
CORE was not the only party to maintain that the right to selfdefense and the individual right to bear arms should be considered
as separate civil rights; nor was it the only party to cite black
history. In fact, several other groups used black history to urge a
ruling in favor of the respondent in Heller as well. To take just one
example, the libertarian aligned Institute for Justice (IFJ) submitted
an amicus brief focused almost exclusively on the rights of freed
slaves. 127 Citing Stephen P. Halbrook, the IFJ maintained that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to protect an
individual right to bear arms precisely because they recognized
that black citizenship was contingent on their ability to acquire
guns. 128 This interest led them to incorporate the right to bear arms
122. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
123. Id.
124. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,417 (1856).
125. CORE Brief, supra note 3, at 39.
126. Id.at 35-39.
127. Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290)
[hereinafter IFJ Brief].
128. Id. at 8.

528

L 0 UISIANA LAW RE VIE W

[Vol. 69

into the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a clause that was subsequently neutered by the
Supreme Court in 1873.129 The decision that did the neutering was
the Slaughter-House Cases, the ruling that severely limited the
13
scope of national citizenship protected by the Constitution. 0
Citing prominent constitutional scholars like Akhil Amar and
Lawrence Tribe, the IFJ concludes by arguing that the Supreme
Court should revisit Slaughter-House and revivify the individual
right. 131
Though the IFJ seems to forget that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply to the District, the group's argument opens the gates
for hunting even larger game, namely state gun bans. The IFJ's
brief suggests, for example, that not only was the Second
Amendment incorporated through the Fourteenth, but there is an
even older, pre-existing right to self-defense independent of the
Second Amendment. Returning to Fourteenth Amendment
legislative history, the IFJ shows that the bill's drafters were
expressly interested in making sure that freed slaves could "defend
their homes, families, or themselves."'] 32 This interest in the
common law right to self-defense helps the IFJ establish gun
ownership as a right pre-existing the Constitution that is protected
by the Second Amendment but not granted by it. 133 To support this
position, the Institute cites Cruikshank the same 1874 case holding
that the right to bear arms was "not a right granted by the
Constitution" nor was it "dependent upon that instrument for its
existence."' 134 While Cruikshank also held that the Second
Amendment only applies to the federal government, and the
federal government cannot intervene to stop private confiscations
of arms, those holdings do not interfere with the IFJ's larger claim
that the right to self-defense, not the Second Amendment, prohibits
state-sponsored gun bans. In fact, the Institute's use of Cruikshank
reinforces its argument that the Court need not incorporate the
Second Amendment to the states to hold gun bans invalid. 135 It
129. Id at 26.
130. Id. at 26-27.
131. Id. at 27 (citing Ahil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1258-59 (1992) and Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
ConstitutionalInterpretation,108 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1297 n.247 (1995)).
132. IFJ Brief, supra note 127, at 13.

133. Id. at 32.
134. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
135. Even though Cruikshank recognized the right to bear arms as a "preexisting" right, it limited the reach of the Second Amendment to the federal
government and did not extend it to private actors. Id.
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need only hold that possessing guns for self-defense is one of the
privileges of
36 citizenship wrongly infringed by state gun
regulations.'
Another brief using black history to argue for an individual right
to bear arms as well as a right to self-defense came from
Congress. 137 Fifty-five United States Senators, almost all
Republican, and 250 United States Representatives, also
overwhelmingly Republican, recruited Fourteenth Amendment
historian Stephen P. Halbrook to file a brief showing that the right
to bear arms mentioned in the Second Amendment is closely tied
to the ancient common law right to self-defense. 138 For northern
Republicans after the Civil War, argued Halbrook, the right to bear
arms had less to do with organizing militias than making sure freed
slaves had constitutional protection. 139 This protection was not
needed from the federal government so much as state governments
who were interested in re-subordinating them. 140 As far as northern
Republicans were concerned, private arms were necessary to
maintain the security of the freedmen's person and estate.' To
further this end, drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to
include the "right to bear arms" as a necessary shield against
discriminatory state legislation, including gun bans, precisely so
them in "defense of [themselves]
that the freed slaves could use 142
and family.., and homestead.'
Though closely related to the individual right to bear arms, the
right to self-defense was, in Halbrook's view, independent of the
Second Amendment. 43 The Second Amendment did not grant the
right to self-defense, nor did it grant the right to bear arms; it
simply prevented the federal government from infringing upon preexisting private gun rights.' The right to self-defense, like the
right to bear arms, was in Halbrook's 45view a "fundamental
guarantee" that pre-dated the Constitution.
That a majority of United States Senators and Representatives
used Halbrook as their spokesperson suggests a relatively dramatic
136. IFJ Brief, supranote 127, at 13.
137. Brief for 55 Members of United States Senate, the President of the
United States Senate, and 250 Members of United States House of
Representatives as Amici Curaie Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter Senate Brief].
138. Id.
139. Id. at 14.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id.at 16.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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convergence of interests around the issues of gun ownership and
self-defense. While it is probably safe to say that CORE represents
only a small portion of the civil rights community, the Halbrook
brief suggests that the civil rights community, traditionally
conceived, may be changing. The new arbiters of civil rights in
America may no longer be black ministers and the NAACP, but
more conservative groups like the IFJ, CORE, and, as we shall see,
the NRA.
Before discussing the NRA's role in prompting a new chapter
of civil rights constitutionalism in America, it is perhaps helpful to
take a look at the NAACP's brief.146 Unlike Halbrook and the IFJ,
the NAACP ignored black history in its Heller brief, arguing that
the African-American past is irrelevant to the constitutionality of
gun bans. What is more important, it maintained, are the effects of
gun violence on African-American residents of urban areas. 147 In
D.C. alone, argued the NAACP, all but two of the 137 firearm
homicide victims in 2004 were black. 48 Many of these victims
were from fifteen to twenty-nine years old. 149 This "contemporary
epidemic of handgun violence," argues the civil rights ,'oup,
suggests that gun bans should be kept in place, not removed.
Not happy with simply citing statistics, the NAACP also
bridled at CORE's insinuation that just because past gun
regulations targeted African-Americans, so too must the present
ones have a discriminatory bent. According to the NAACP, this is
simply not the case "with respect to the District's handgun ban"-a ban popularly enacted by the city's black majority."'5 To say that
such a ban categorically does "not serve the interests" of AfricanAmerican communities is paternalistic if not insulting to black
voters in Washington. 52 For most black residents of the District,
the gun ban is not only reasonable but "should not be confused
with the Black153Codes" enacted in the American South following
the Civil War.
Perhaps because of concerns like the NAACP's, the NRA
chose not to focus on black history, turning instead to the founders'
interpretation of the Second Amendment and the essential right to
"employ deadly force in self-defense." 54 Yet, it arguably takes a
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

NAACP Brief, supra note 14.
Id.at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 6.
Id. at 18 n.19.
Id.
Id.at 19, 31.
NRA Brief, supra note 7, at 30, 31.
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jab at the NAACP, opening its brief with the claim that it is
"America's oldest civil rights organization."' 155 This assertion,
precisely because it is so provocative, warrants at least some
scrutiny. While it is true that the NRA was founded in 1871,
almost four decades before the NAACP, the National Rifle
Association did not pitch itself as a civil rights organization until
the 1970s. Prior to then, the NRA focused primarily on recreation,
target shooting, and training, not defending the right to bear arms.
In fact, from 1871 to 1977 the NRA's main agenda was promoting
marksmanship and safety.' 56 Founded by Civil War veterans
disgruntled with the Army's lack of emphasis on "target practice,"
a skill the military believed would instill a negative "sense of
individualism among the soldiers," the NRA built a state-of-the-art
rifle range at Creedmoor, New York, to train soldiers, primarily
National Guardsmen, in marksmanship. 15 7 The NRA also began
holding shooting competitions including an international
competition that drew almost 8,000 spectators to Creedmoor in
1874.158 From 1874 to 1977, marksmanship training and firearms
safety remained the primary concerns of the NRA, while
lobbying
59
formed only a minor part of its institutional mission.1
Then, in 1968, Congress enacted a sweeping Gun Control Act
(GCA), spurred by outrage over Lee Harvey Oswald's use of an
Italian army surplus rifle to assassinate President John F.
Kennedy. 160 While older NRA leaders tended to support the
legislation, a younger cadre of "hard-liners" viewed the GCA to be
the beqinning of a larger, liberal assault on gun rights in the United
States. 61 Led by a former Border Patrol officer named Harlon
Carter, these "Young Turks" voted proponents of the GCA out of
power in 1977 and quickly made lobbying against
62 gun regulations
one of the primary functions of the association. 1
As the NRA began to shift emphasis away from marksmanship
and towards preventing regulation, it began to place unprecedented
emphasis on the Second Amendment as a vital constitutional right.
Never much of an issue while the NRA occupied itself with target
shooting, the Second Amendment became the cornerstone of the
association's legal bulwark against potential gun regulators,
155. Id.at 1.
156. OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA
GUN CONTROL 20-22 (Univ. of Iowa 1998).
157. Id.at 21.
158. Id.at 23.
159. Id.at 29.
160. Id.at 30.
161. Id.at 30, 34.
162. Id.at 31-36.
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particularly the portion of the amendment, which reads "the riglot
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.",13
Despite the fact that the preceding clause referred to the necessity
of a "well-regulated militia," the NRA took the position that the
64
right to bear arms was independent of any militia concern.
Though many historians disagreed, the NRA increased emphasis
on the individual right, maintaining that it was necessary to prevent
authoritarian rule, or "creeping socialism," and to facilitate selfdefense. 165
Over the course of the 1990s, NRA advocates fleshed out the
dual position that not only was the right to bear arms an individual
constitutional right, but the right to bear arms in self-defense was
an even ireater, absolute right also worthy of constitutional
protection. 66 In 1994, NRA official Wayne LaPierre argued that
the "use of arms for self-defense" was a right that derived from
natural law itself, pre-dating the founding. 167 One year later, Tanya
Metaksa, executive director for the NRA's Institute for Legislative
Action, maintained that self-defense was nothing less
168 than "a
primary civil right" without which "there are no rights."'
Metaksa's attempt to frame self-defense as a civil right defied
common conceptions of the term but reflected a growing
consensus on the right that gun ownership and justified killing
should be considered on the same plane as classic civil rights, like
the right to vote. By assuming this position, the gun lobby engaged
in a relatively radical expansion of the concept of civil rights, but
not one completely without precedent. As early as 1964, President
Lyndon Johnson had signed into law an ambitious Civil Rights Act
that included provisions aimed at ending discrimination in the
private workplace, not something that most would have associated
with a civil right prior to 1964. In 1968, Congress continued its
expansion of civil rights claims by handing down another
ambitious piece of legislation targeting discrimination in private
163. Id. at 135.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 156. For a sampling of historians who oppose the individual rights
reading, see Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 309 (1998); Saul Comell, Don't Know Much About History:
The Current Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. REv. 657
(2002); David Thomas Konig, Arms and the Man: What Did the Right to
"Keep" Arms Mean in the Early Republic, 25 L. & HIST. REv. 177 (2007).
166. Wayne LaPierre, Self-Defense: The Right and the Deterrent, in GuNs,
CRIME AND FREEDOM (1994), reprinted in GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER 174
(Jan E. Dizard, Robert Merrill Muth & Stephen P. Andrews eds., 1999).
167. Id.
168. Tanya K. Metaksa, Self-Defense: A Primary Civil Right, 41 AM.
RIFLEMAN 74 (1995).
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housing, again not a civil right traditionally conceived. Suddenly,
civil rights actions abounded in areas of the law that had never
harbored them before, as liberals employed the authoritative
69
language of rights talk to rationalize redistributive social change.'
In the 1970s and 80s, conservatives responded with their own
versions of "rights talk," sometimes relying on the very gains made
by the civil rights movement in the 1960s to counter liberal
positions. 170 To take just one non-gun related example, Phyllis
Schlafly opposed the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972 by
declaring that equal opportunity for women had already found
expression in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 17 1 In 1978, conservatives
adopted the language of rights to protect children from liberal
influences in public school, particularly sex education, by adopting
the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment. 172 In 1984, the
Republican Party's National Platform endorsed legislation
designed to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment, once
aimed at protecting freed slaves, now applied to unborn children
who had a "fundamental individual right to life.' 7 3 By the 1990s,
gun rights proponents had also begun to master "rights talk,"
arguing that the right to bear arms made other rights possible,
precisely because an armed citizenry precluded the need for a
police state. 174 Eager to separate guns from concerns over state
militias, groups like the NRA located the right to bear arms in
more than one source: not just the Second Amendment, but also
the right to armed self-defense.
IV.THE MAJORITY OPINION
At first glance, the Court does not appear to be particularly
influenced by the NRA's designation of self-defense as a primary
civil right or by the resuscitation of black history engaged in by
CORE, the IFJ, and Congress. 175 The Court begins its opinion, as
169. Dudas, supra note 9, at 732.
170. Conservatives also deployed the language of rights in the 1950s and
1960s, particularly "states' rights" in the American South. See generally KARl
FREDRICKSON, THE DIXIECRAT REVOLT AND THE END OF THE SOLID SOUTH,

1932 TO 1968 (2000).
171. DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS
CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN'S CRUSADE 225-26 (William Chafe et al. eds.,
Princeton Univ. Press 2005).
172. Id.at 286-87.
173. Id.at 286.
174. See, e.g., Metaksa, supra note 168, at 195.
175. Despite the fact that Scalia's conclusion echoes CORE's plea for arms
as a means of augmenting the regulatory function of the police, the majority
opinion does not mention the civil rights group once. Only two sources emerge
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might be expected, with a textual analysis of the Second
Amendment, noting that the term "right of the people" appears in
the First Amendment's Assembly and Petition Clause and in the
Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause. Since both
clauses refer to individual rights, the Court holds that the right to
bear arms must
76 also be read as an individual right unrelated to a
state militia. 1
The Court provides another textualist basis for the individual
right by asserting that throughout the eighteenth century, "bear
arms" was unambiguously used to refer to gun ownership outside
of an organized militia.' 7 This was true, the Court argues, despite
the fact that "bear arms" also had an idiomatic meaning at the time
of the founding, which meant "to serve as a soldier, do military
service," or "wage war."' 78 That meaning only became active, the
Court argues, when used in the context of repelling foreign
invasions or engaging in military action, moments signified by
lacing the right immediately before the term
textually
"against."
Once done with its textual analysis, the Court moves to an
originalist argument challenging Jack Rakove and David Konig.
While Rakove and Konig maintain that the prefatory clause, "[a]
well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free
State," limits the right to bear arms to formal militia service, the
Court counters by noting that there were no formal militias in the
eighteenth century. 180 Unlike today's National Guard, militias at
that time were made up of every man in the state able to bear
arms.181 Though Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution granted
Congress the power to provide arms to such state militiamen,

in the opinion that could arguably have come from CORE. One is
Representative Butler's quotation that section 8 of the anti-KKK bill was
intended to enforce the individual citizen's right to bear arms. Another is
Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, a book that
is also cited in two other amicus briefs. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs (1998). Given
that so few sources are shared, it appears unlikely that CORE swayed the Court
alone. Instead, it seems more likely that a convergence of interests occurred,
bringing African-American history to the forefront of the majority's opinion.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810-11 (2008); CORE brief,
supra note 3, at 10, 14.
176. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791.
177. Id. at 2793.
178. Id. at 2830.
179. Id.at 2829.
180. Id.at 2799.
181. Id.
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neither Congress nor the Constitution guaranteed that such arms
would be provided. 8 2 Indeed, anti-federalists feared that the
federal government would not provide weapons to states precisely
to weaken them. 83 This fear helps explain why state law at the
time was "tolerant of private ownership of weapons," a guarantee
that even if states did not have the time or money to adequately
arm their militias, then at least state militiamen could use their own
private arms in emergencies.' 84 Precisely because militiamen might
need to use their own private arms, anti-federalists demanded a
promise from the federal
85 government that the people's right to bear
arms not be infringed. 1
By explaining the link between private gun ownership and the
states' need for an armed militia, the Supreme Court mounts a
reasonable challenge to Rakove and Konig. Although both
historians deny that the Second Amendment was designed to
protect a private right to bear arms, they concede that antifederalists were afraid the federal government might try to
undermine state militias.' 86 They also concede that state militias
might be armed privately.' 87 However, they refuse to take seriously
the possibility that the federal government might have tried to
confiscate or regulate private gun ownership as an indirect means
of crippling state militias. 188 Perhaps this is because the federal
government never attempted such a move. Regardless, Scalia
refuses to accept the notion that the central government would not,
at some point, try to confiscate arms in order to subjugate the
people. To establish this point, Scalia invokes English history,
noting that the Crown had confiscated the arms of Protestants
expressly to subjugate them following the Restoration.' 89 "[T]he
way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied
men," notes Scalia in his majority opinion, "was not by banning the
militia but simply by taking away the people's arms ....
,9
While the Supreme Court could have easily ended there,
deciding Heller on its originalist and textualist analyses alone, it
goes on. In order to fully appreciate the individual nature of the
Second Amendment, argues the Court, it is necessary not simply to
look at original meaning or text, but to examine the public
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Rakove Brief, supra note 75, at 10.
Id.at 21-22.
Id.at 31.
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797-98.
Rakove Brief,supranote 75, at 18-19.
Id.at 20.
Id.at 21.
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2798.
Id. at 2801.
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understanding of the right to bear arms over the course of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 191 While Justice Stevens
derides this as a foray into irrelevant "postenactment legislative
192
history," Scalia, in a decidedly non-originalist mood, disagrees.
Leaving the founders aside for a moment, Scalia asserts that
analyzing the public understanding of constitutional provisions
long after they are enacted
193 is in fact a "critical tool of
constitutional interpretation.
In order to assess public understandings of the right to bear
194
arms in the nineteenth century, Scalia turns to black history.
Echoing CORE, Scalia cites Virginia's antebellum restrictions on
gun control, including Aldridge v. Commonwealth, an 1824 case
from Virginia holding that the right to bear arms did not apply to
free blacks entering the state. 195 Scalia then cites Waters v. State,
an 1843 Maryland case that openly declared free blacks to be a
dangerous population that should be denied the right to bear
arms. 19 6 Both cases, according to the Court, reveal that the right to
albeit one "subject to certain
bear arms "was
197 an individual right,"
restrictions.'
After flagging the restriction of black arms during slavery,
Scalia moves to Reconstruction noting that "[b]lacks were
98
routinely disarmed by Southern States after the Civil War."'
Citing a Freedmen's Bureau Report from Kentucky, he shows how
a state policy of confiscating black-owned weapons was perceived
by federal officers to be in violation of an individual, not collective
rights to bear arms. 199 Scalia then turns to South Carolina and
quotes from a joint congressional report claiming that attempts to
arms were in "clear and direct violation of their
confiscate black 200
personal rights."
By including southern Reconstruction in its opinion, the
majority is able to show that following the Civil War the right to
bear arms was considered a uniquely individual right. Southern
attempts to rob blacks of their weapons, after all, had little to do
with organizing militias. In fact, the opposite of what the anti191. Id.at 2805.
192. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2805-07.
195. Id at 2808 (citing Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449
(Va. Gen. Ct. 1824)).
196. Id. (citing Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843)).
197. Id.
198. Id.at 2810.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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federalists had feared in the eighteenth century was happening.
Rather than the federal government confiscating private arms in
order to weaken the states, the states were confiscating private
arms in order to weaken the pro-Reconstruction federal
government in the South.
Of course, this did not give the Supreme Court the power to
challenge private confiscations of arms, nor did it give it the power
to use the Second Amendment to invalidate state gun bans. The
Court made this clear in United States v. Cruikshank in 1875. 20 1 As
mentioned earlier, Cruikshank held that the Second Amendment
only applied to the federal government, not the states and only
applied to government action, not private conduct.2° 2 Perhaps
ironically, this position actually supports Scalia's ruling in Heller
given that Cruickshank allows for Second Amendment protection
against federally enforced gun bans, like the one in the District.
Further, because Cruickshank is a Supreme Court case, it provides
Scalia with more than just a public understanding of the Second
Amendment during the nineteenth century; it gives him judicial
precedent.20 3
While Cruickshank helps Scalia achieve the limited goal of
striking down the District's gun ban, it does something else as
well. By clearly asserting that the right to bear arms is a preexisting common law right, it opens the door for Scalia to elaborate
pre-existing common law right: the right
on the other significant,
4
to self-defense.

0

That self-defense might be its own right, independent of the
Second Amendment, is a position that the Supreme Court openly
endorses in Heller. According to Scalia, "self-defense" is nothing
less than an inherent right that is particularly acute when it comes
to defense of the home. ° Scalia's invocation of the inherent right
to bear arms is reminiscent of claims made by gun proponents like
LaPierre since the 1980s. 206 It is also evocative of a long line of
Supreme Court decisions that have used the notion of inherent
rights to reinforce principles long accepted by ancient English
common law.20 7 Though reluctant to read new implied rights into

201. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
202. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812-13.
203. See generally David A. Strauss,
Interpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996).

Common Law

Constitutional

204. Id.
205. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2864.
206. See, e.g., LaPierre, supra note 166, at 174.
207. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); E. Hartford v.
Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.) 511 (1850); Bergess Poole v. John
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the Constitution, Scalia has long been open to upholding ancient
rights pre-dating the founding.20 8 This might explain his
willingness to invoke post-ratification black history, which if
anything is a history of the need for armed self-defense as a shield
for protecting life and citizenship. Even if Scalia is not really
interested in race, his invocation of race provides a compelling link
between self-defense, a longstanding creature of the common law,
and the Constitution.
After mentioning Cruickshank, the Court concludes with a
discussion of handguns. 20 9 Noting that self-defense has been
central to the Second Amendment, the majority asserts that the
handgun is the "quintessential self-defense weapon."2 10 Denying
citizens such a weapon, maintains the Court, makes it impossible
for them to defend their homes where the need for defense of self,
family, and property is most acute. 2 1 1 The Court's assertion that
private individuals must be allowed handguns in order to defend
self and property coincides closely with CORE's argument that
African-Americans need weapons in order to defend themselves
from violent crime. According to both, the state is not only
incapable of protecting citizens from attack, but is indifferent to
their plight, actually making it harder for citizens to protect
themselves. Given that rights to property and life itself are at risk,
the Court suggests that some kind of private rights enforcement
must be authorized, beyond the purview of the police.
That the Supreme Court strikes down the District's gun ban as
if it were yet another regulation burdening African-Americans,
much like the Black Codes, highlights the Court's larger shift away
from the concerns of groups like the NAACP and towards a new
civil rights.212 One way to read this is that the Court is using the
goal of racial equality as a type of facade, a screen to hide some
other agenda that has nothing to do with race. Just as the Cold War
animated Brown, in other words, so too might the Court be worried
about larger political considerations in Heller losing rural white
voters to the Democratic Party perhaps, or angering powerful

Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837); Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 290 (1813); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
208. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). See also STEPHEN M.
GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 172-73

(1996).
209. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-22.
210. Id.at 2818.
211. Id. at2817.
212. Washington's Black Majority is Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/us/16washington.html?ref=us.
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lobbies like the National Rifle Association. Of course, even if the
Supreme Court were interested in placating lobbyists and rightcentered voters, perhaps to get more conservatives on the Court
during the next presidential administration, nothing compels it to
cite black history. If anything, Scalia's deployment of black history
appears to compromise his commitment to originalism. After all,
how can popular understandings of the Second Amendment in the
1870s possibly indicate the founders' intent in the 1780s?
Perhaps the best explanation for Scalia's foray into black
history is that it provides him with a dramatic entry-point for
discussing the right to bear arms from within the context of the
213
much older, pre-existing common law right to self-defense.
While Rakove and Konig are correct that the founders did not
spend much time discussing the right to self-defense, this does not
mean that the right did not exist, nor that they rejected it. In fact,
the English Bill of Rights expressly mentioned it in 1689, marking
the beginning
of its long career as a pillar of English common
21
law.
V. IMPLICATIONS

What implications does Heller's resurrection of the inherent
right to self-defense coupled with the individual right to bear arms
have for constitutional law or constitutional theory generally?
There are at least three. One, Heller does more than simply hold
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear
arms; it suggests that the individual right to bear arms emanates
from sources beyond the Second Amendment. One such source is
the inherent right to armed self-defense. 215 This right, which the
NRA has stressed for the past thirty years, pre-dates the
Constitution and exists as a type of fundamental or natural right.216
The most likely implication of this is that by identifying an
inherent right to self-defense, the Court is preparing the battlefield
for striking down handgun bans at the state and local level. At
present, Heller has no bearing on the states because the Second
213. See, e.g., RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, No DUTY TO RETREAT:
VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 3-5 (1991);
KERMIT L. HALL, PAUL FINKELMAN & JAMES W. ELY, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 34-35 (3d ed. 2005).

214. Id.
215. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
216. Id. at 2793. If states insist on banning "the quintessential self-defense
weapon," the handgun, then they are arguably depriving persons of their liberty
without due process of law, or denying citizens one of their most sacred
privileges and immunities. Id. at 2818.
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Amendment has never been incorporated. This could change if the
Court decides to hear a challenge to a municipal gun ban outside
the capitol, of which there is already one in Chicago. 217 If the
Court takes the Chicago case, Scalia's opinion in Heller suggests
that it might decide to overthrow Chicago's gun ban on any one of
three grounds. First, it could use the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to overrule Cruikshank and incorporate the
Second Amendment's individual right to bear arms to the states.
Second, it could revisit the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and do exactly what the Institute for
Justice requests, which is to overturn the Slaughter-House Cases
and identify the individual right to bear arms as one of the
privileges of national citizenship. 21 Third, the Court could hold
that even without privileges and immunities or even the Second
Amendment, the right to armed self-defense exists as an inherent
right necessitating the federal invalidation of state gun bans. If it
wanted to get more specific, the Court could include armed selfdefense within the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest, using
the Due Process Clause to overturn
state gun bans without
219
overturning any of its own rulings.
While Scalia has traditionally been averse to liberty interest
arguments precisely because they have been used to create implied
rights, the right to self-defense might be different. 22 0 Unlike the
right to privacy, the right to self-defense is no product of
ephemeral penumbras, but a pillar of ancient common law. 22 1 To
illustrate this, Scalia quotes Blackstone, noting that people have a
"natural right of resistance and self-preservation" as well as the
right to use "arms for self-preservation and defence. 2 2 2 Scalia
goes on to cite other sources as well, including the English Bill of

217. Dahleen Glanton, New Battles Erupt Over Gun Laws Following
Supreme Court Decision, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 2008, http://archives.chicago
tribune.com/2008/juU/27/nation/chi-gunlaws-bdjul27.
218. Justice Thomas has already intimated that he might be interested in
revisiting the Slaughter-House Cases. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
219. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
220. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1986) (Scalia maintaining
that a fundamental right must be a right "traditionally protected by our society").
Stephen M. Griffin notes that Scalia has been open to fundamental rights
arguments so long as the "common law protected the right in question."
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 172 (1996).
221. WYANE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 522-68 (4th ed. 2003).
222. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008) (citing 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES * 136, *139-40).
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"may have
Rights, which held as early as 1689 that Protestants
223
arms for their defense suitable to their conditions.,
Even if Heller is not applied to the states, its endorsement of
both an individual right to bear arms and an inherent right to selfdefense marks an interesting constitutional moment nevertheless.
Unlike the mainstream civil rights interests that endorsed Brown,
Heller marks a victory for a much more radical strain of black
activism rooted in a tradition of armed self-defense. Long a part of
African-American history in the United States, armed self-defense
became particularly popular after black soldiers returned from
overseas at the end of World War 11.224 Some black veterans like
ex-Marine Robert F. Williams returned home convinced that guns
were critical to the achievement of true racial equality. 225 Though
views like Williams's were temporarily obscured in the 1950s and
1960s by nonviolent direct action, even nonviolent groups like
CORE moved towards a more arms-friendly stance as vigilante
killings of black activists mounted in the Deep South in the
1960s. 226 By 1968, CORE had become a leading advocate of
armed self-defense, along with popular black martyr Malcolm X,
Committee leader H. Rap
Student Nonviolent Coordinating
227
Brown, and the Black Panthers.
Ironically, many black proponents of armed self-defense
became Republican, underscoring the fact that black radicalism
tended to share commonalities with libertarian conservatism. 228 For
example, one of the few black organizations to publicly endorse
223. Id. (citing 1 W. & M., c. 2, §7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689).
Scalia also cites 2 J. DE LOLME, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION 886-87 (A. Stephens ed., 1838) (1784); G. SHARP, TRACTS
CONCERNING THE ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL

DEFENCE BY A FREE MILITIA 17-18, 27 (3d ed. 1782)).
224. TIMOTHY B. TYSON, RADIO FREE DIXIE: ROBERT F. WILLIAMS AND THE
ROOTS OF BLACK POWER 37 (1999).

225. Id.at 49-89.
226. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, or SNCC, went
through a similar transformation. One reason for this was that both SNCC and
CORE focused on grassroots organizing in the Deep South, possibly the most
dangerous type of civil rights work. The NAACP and even the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, SCLC, focused on more strategic modes of
activism, including litigation and media manipulation respectively. See
generally CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK
AWAKENING OF THE 1960s (1981).
227. LANCE HILL, THE DEACONS FOR DEFENSE: ARMED RESISTANCE AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2004); CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN, PURE FIRE:
SELF-DEFENSE AS ACTIVISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2005).
228. CHRISTOPHER ALAN BRACEY, SAVIORS OR SELL-OUTS: THE PROMISE
AND PERIL OF BLACK CONSERVATISM FROM BOOKER T. WASHINGTON TO
CONDOLEEZZA RICE 109-10 (2008).
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Heller was Project 21, an organization of black conservatives who
announced in a press release that the Court's gun ruling was 229
"a
great day for law abiding citizens" in the District of Columbia.
While Project 21 represents a distinct minority of AfricanAmerican voters in the United States, their endorsement of armed
self-defense resonates with a long tradition of black militancy in
America, a tradition that Scalia might sympathize with.23 °
Even if Scalia does not harbor any sympathy for black
nationalism, his opinion highlights a convergence of conservative
thinking and black power nevertheless. If Heller represents
anything, it is a decidedly private, non-state oriented stance
towards social policy. Indeed, Heller might be viewed as a type of
anti-statist alternative to the big government solutions and
programs devised in the 1960s and 1970s including Title VII, Head
Start, Food Stamps, and even affirmative action, all of which
provided regulatory mechanisms by which minorities could either
seek redress for rights infringement or gain access to goods or
services. 23 1 Title VII, for example, transformed the federal courts
into a quasi-regulatory body assigned the duty of policing private
industry hiring practices. 32 Head Start, Food Stamps, and
affirmative action, by contrast, created regulatory bodies that
administered goods and services to those who confronted structural
racism and institutional discrimination at the macro-level.233
Heller represents a very different type of regulatory philosophy
from the one that animated the Civil Rights Acts and the Great
Society. Unlike Title VII and Head Start, Heller is de-regulatory in
the sense that it aims to dismantle a relatively intrusive set of legal
rules prohibiting private ownership of certain guns. Though the
229. Press Release, Project 21, District of Columbia v. Heller Supreme Court
Second Amendment Decision Hailed by Black Activists (June 26, 2008) (on file
with author).
230. If this is true, he might be reflecting a sentiment held by fellow justice
Clarence Thomas, who actually admitted to sympathizing with black power in a
recent memoir. "The more I read about the black power movement," recalled
Thomas, "the more I wanted to be a part of it." CLARENCE THOMAS, MY
GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR 48 (2007). To take another example,
presidential candidate Barack Obama expressed qualified support for the ruling,
declaring that Heller "will provide much-needed guidance to local jurisdictions"
and that the Supreme Court's opinion endorsing an individual "right to bear
arms" did not have to be inconsistent with keeping "our communities and our
children safe." Supreme Court Overturns D.C. Gun Ban; What Next? (Nat'l
Pub. Radio broadcast July 3, 2008).
231. MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN & DAVID MERMELSTEIN, THE GREAT SOCIETY
READER: THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 13-24 (1967).
232. Id.
233. Id
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NAACP rejects the notion that this will help blacks, Scalia
disagrees, making Heller's deregulation of guns a kind of postmodem parallel to Brown's deregulation of state bans on
interracial contact. 234" In both cases, the Supreme Court removed
legal restrictions that, in its opinion, harmed minorities. 235 In both
cases, the regulations in question had initially emerged under a
rubric of attempting to reduce crime, violence, and dangerous
social conflict in urban areas. 36 While Jim Crow's early history as
a police law aimed at reducing racial tensions is often overlooked,
recovering it helps put Scalia's Heller opinion in a larger
perspective. By invalidating the District's gun ban, the Roberts
Court appears to join the Warren Court in cabining government
and creating zones of freedom in which individuals regulate
themselves, with whatever violence that might ensue, free from
state intervention and expense. Within these zones, the deployment
of legally sanctioned violence is not simply a function of the
regulatory apparatus of the state, i.e. the courts
and the police, but
23 7
the inherent right of the people themselves.
While most regulatory scholars would probably not say that
armed self-defense performs a regulatory function, Scalia appears
to disagree. By upholding an individual right to armed selfdefense, the Court gently shifts the burden of crime control from
the state to private citizens who, in acts of vigilante justice, will
now arrest, prosecute, and execute criminal offenders on their own.
Though vigilantism is generally not thought of as a social practice
that performs a regulatory function, it has a long history of doing
just that in the United States.23 In the late nineteenth century,
vigilantism became a frequent form of substitute law enforcement
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in the West. 239 Vigilante groups emerged in California, Colorado,
Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Montana, and other states. 24° According to
one chronicler of western vigilantism, "[s]wift and terrible
retribution is the only preventive of crime, while society is
organizing in the far West.",24 1 Collectively, western vigilantes
Friedman has called a "private
formed what historian Lawrence
242
system of criminal justice."
Heller suggests that the same thing might be happening in the
District of Columbia. By overturning D.C.'s gun ban in the name
of promoting self-defense, the Court seems to be intentionally
be
fostering a climate in which "swift and terrible retribution" will 243
meted out to violent offenders by law-abiding private citizens.
This represents a significant devolution of power from the State,
which in most developed countries has a monopoly on legalized
violence. 44 By devolving the power of legalized violence, the
Court does the exact opposite of what criminal law scholar
Jonathan Simon claims that American government has done since
the 1960s. According to Simon, government in the U.S. has used
crime to legitimate an expansion of new forms of state power,
whether more aggressive policing or more invasive public control
of private life.24 Heller does something very different. It devolves
power-in this case the state's monopoly over the power to inflict
death no less-into the hands of private parties.
What are we to make of this? One, the Supreme Court seems to
be declaring that government has failed America's cities. Not only
have police failed to control crime, but the various Great Society
programs that were initiated to solve what Thomas J. Sugrue has
called "the urban crisis" have failed to slow the root sources of
crime.246 Conceding that the state has been incapable of preventing
crime, the Court is now shifting the burden of policing, frontierstyle, onto the people themselves. Rather than increase the power
of the criminal justice system over private life, as Simon argues,
239. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL
STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM (1975).
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241. FRIEDMAN, supra note 240, at 440.
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Heller suggests that the government has begun to devolve power to
private individuals, entrusting them with what is perhaps the state's
most awesome prerogative: the right to take human life.
While Simon sees a malicious state determined to incarcerate
minorities, Heller indicates an exasperated state incapable of
preserving social order. Mass incarceration, though staggering, has
failed. So too have the various recent innovations in policing,
"Comp-Stat," broken windows, and so on.24 7 This suggests that
Heller might best be framed as part of a larger conservative move
towards "a private system
248 of criminal justice" away from the
prison-industrial complex.
Heller's move towards private criminal justice has implications
for other areas of law besides self-defense including the death
penalty. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the death
penalty in America was frequently administered by vigilantes, not
state actors. 24 9 Only with great effort did states intervene, claim a
monopoly on the infliction of death, and surround the death
penalty with a series of procedural protections designed to reduce
the "carnival" aspect of killing and guarantee that the innocent
were not executed. 250 Today, thanks to procedural protections,
most offenders who are sentenced to death are never actually
executed. 2 51 This tracks a larger ambivalence about the death
penalty in the United States, spurred by the Innocence Project and
other programs that have revealed fundamental flaws in America's
death penalty system. 252 Even the Supreme Court has seemed
increasingly ambivalent about the 2Renalty of late, refusing to
extend it to child rapists and minors.
Enter Heller. Even as the Court appears to be gaining doubts
about the death penalty, Heller appears to be moving us in the
opposite direction, towards vigilante executions. Indeed, the Court
now appears to be shifting the onus of the electric chair itself onto
private hands. Of course, private executions will happen irregularly
and erratically, in the midst of violent confrontations on the street
247.
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and in private homes; but they will arguably still happen. What
was once a special creature of the criminal law, the justification
excuse, is now becoming a deregulated policy substitute for failed
crime control.
Of course, this raises the question: has crime control truly
failed? For the past two decades, crime has dropped dramatically
in the United States. 254 At the same time, state and federal prisons
have exploded in number and size, incarcerating upwards of two
million people, far higher than in most developed countries. 255 For
some, this dialectic of mass incarceration and reduced crime rates
are linked, indicating that the criminal justice system is not only
working, but is working overtime, successfully removing hordes of
dangerous offenders from the streets.256
Assuming that American criminal justice has succeeded, not
failed, the Supreme Court's ruling in Heller may still indicate a
slight discomfort with how it has succeeded. Apparently
unconcerned with encroaching state power, American voters have
seemed so eager to improve security that they have channeled
unprecedented amounts of public money into constructing a
"prison-industrial complex" that might reasonably be said to mark
the beginnings of a modem police state.2 57 Despite its professed
commitment to defendants' rights, American criminal justice has
become what some criminologists refer to as an "assembly-line"
where trials rarely happen, offenders are encouraged to plead
guilty, and defense lawyers are pushed by institutional constraints
to spend more time accommodating "the courtroom work group"
than defending clients.258 At the same time, police have adopted
increasingly aggressive approaches to fighting crime, often
focusing on minor "quality of life" crimes rather than violent
felonies or grand larcenies.
Police have also begun deploying
increasingly sophisticated technologies, including crime mapping,
DNA testing, and urban26 camera systems, all with an eye to
increasing public security. 0
While all of this statism does not appear to be bothering the
majority of voters, it should, theoretically, bother conservatives. In
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fact, conservative antipathy to big government might explain
Scalia's willingness to ride roughshod over local popular sentiment
in D.C. as well as reject the desperate appeals of the NAACP, an
enthusiastically pro-government, if not popular, civil rights group.
To anyone truly interested in curbing state power, the type of
draconian gun bans imposed in the District smack of
authoritarianism helping explain Scalia's interest in overturning
them.
Overturning gun bans serves other interests as well. By
recovering an inherent right to armed self-defense, Scalia places
the justified use of deadly force by private citizens at the forefront
of the gun debate, arguably introducing a new non-state sponsored
deterrent to future crime. If enough private citizens carry guns,
private deterrence might actually lower crime rates on its own,
without the help of the prison-industrial complex. To someone
concerned about encroaching state power, private arms provide an
answer to how the state can be cabined and crime can be handled.
Finally, private arms also reduce the chance that the state will need
to impinge on other rights in order to guarantee security, an
argument long made by constitutional activists in the NRA.
VI. CONCLUSION

Today, the interests that once-converged to support civil rights
in the 1950s and 60s are no more. The Cold War is over, dejure
segregation is gone, and the South is booming. It should perhaps
be no surprise then that the Roberts Court has felt comfortable
invalidating aggressive laws aimed at achieving racial integration
in Seattle and Louisville in 2007. 26 ' But just because the Roberts
Court ruled against desegregation schemes in Parents Involved
262
does not mean that it is cutting back on civil rights entirely.
Heller suggests that the Court is willing to go in a new, arguably
more radical direction. In a strange coda to Malcolm X's infamous
Cleveland speech, the Supreme Court appears to be writing the
first pages of a new chapter on civil rights, one aimed not simply at
the constitutional endorsement of an263individual right to bear arms,
but an inherent right to self-defense.
Though not civil rights in the traditional sense, both the
individual right to bear arms and the common law right to selfdefense have been touted as civil rights by a conservative, biracial
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coalition intent on providing citizens with the means necessary for
defending themselves against violent crime. Though some of the
impetus for this movement has come from what political scientist
Jeffrey R. Dudas has termed the "politics of resentment," much of
it reflects a genuine conviction that without arms, the only longterm alternative to crime control is a rights-averse police state.a64
In the short term, the Court's turn to self-defense may sound
the death knell for gun bans in cities like Chicago. Justice Scalia's
invocation of self-defense as an inherent right provides the Court
with an option for invalidating gun bans that does not necessarily
rely on incorporating the Second Amendment to the states or
overturning past precedent. 265 Precisely because the right to selfdefense existed at common law, the Court could easily hold that
any state measure unreasonably abridging a citizens' ability to
meet imminent harm with deadly
force is a deprivation of liberty
266
without due process of law.
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